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Malawi Shock-Responsive Social Protection (SRSP) Case Study 
Daniel Longhurst and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler 
 
Summary  
Shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) is increasingly being explored by a range of 
actors to link humanitarian assistance and longer-term development interventions and build 
the capacity of governments to manage the full spectrum of shocks that people face through 
integrated and aligned systems and programmes. To date, however, evidence of what has 
been tested and learned is limited. Malawi faces cyclical natural disasters including droughts, 
dry spells, flooding and pest infestations, with consistently high humanitarian caseloads 
including 6.7 million people affected by El Niño in 2015/16. Meanwhile, the government and 
development partners have made significant progress in developing social protection 
systems and programmes, and since 2015 have looked to tailor and align them to 
humanitarian processes to better manage and respond to climate shocks, through trialling a 
diverse range of SRSP activities. This paper provides an overview of the Malawi context as it 
relates to SRSP, the key efforts undertaken to date, and summarises the rich learning and 
reflections from policy to systems and programmes. By so doing, the paper aims to inform 
the future trajectory of SRSP in Malawi, as well as in other countries and contexts in Africa 
and beyond.  
 
Keywords: shock-responsive social protection; Malawi; humanitarian assistance; social 
protection; disasters; shock-response; climate change; food security; humanitarian–
development nexus. 
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1 Case study rationale/definitions 
1.1 Case study rationale  
Under the framework of a wider partnership between the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) and Irish Aid on social protection, a research theme on shock-responsive social 
protection (SRSP) is being developed. To date, this includes two framing documents, the first 
on the humanitarian–development continuum (Ulrichs and Sabates-Wheeler 2018), and the 
second on the role of cash in social protection, humanitarian response and SRSP contexts 
(Roelen, Longhurst and Sabates-Wheeler 2018).1 These framing papers are complemented 
by three case studies – in Ethiopia, Uganda and Malawi. This paper presents the Malawi 
case study.  By reviewing common thinking, lessons learned and country-specific 
approaches towards SRSP in different contexts, the research aims to understand the 
constraints and opportunities to putting in place social protection systems that are able to flex 
and respond to shocks, and to help Irish Aid as well as national and international 
policymakers to better understand how to operationalise the humanitarian–development 
nexus.  
 
Under the Malawi component, IDS was asked to undertake a short country visit and provide 
a case study of the main shock-responsive social protection efforts that have taken place in 
the country since 2016.2  The case study presented here looks at both the policy and 
programme level, and reflects on lessons learned, barriers, successes, and future priorities 
for the SRSP agenda in Malawi. The case study methodology centred on a series of semi-
structured interviews with key stakeholders working on social protection and humanitarian 
assistance based in the capital, Lilongwe, and was complemented by a desk study/literature 
review. A synthesis report on all three country case studies will be published in 2019.  
 
1.2 Definitions 
Whilst a commonly agreed global definition of SRSP does not exist, the work of Oxford 
Policy Management (OPM) describes SRSP as ‘the potential role for long-term social 
protection systems in the response to large-scale shocks, either before or after the crisis 
occurs; and… opportunities for coordination (and possible integration) of humanitarian 
interventions, disaster risk management (DRM) and social protection’ (O’Brien et al. 2018: ii). 
SRSP consists of one or more of the following features or functions:  
 
 Vertical expansion – Increase the duration or value of benefit for existing recipients;  
 Horizontal expansion – Increase the number of beneficiaries in the event of a crisis; 
 Piggybacking – Use an existing programme’s infrastructure;   
 Shadow alignment – Alignment or parallel implementation of social protection and/or 
humanitarian interventions: a combination of these may be most appropriate; and 
 Refocusing – Reprioritising existing resources.  
 
Poor and vulnerable communities in Malawi are exposed to an increasingly complex and 
interlinked array of hazards, many driven by climate variability and climate change, but also 
macroeconomic shocks (e.g. food price volatility) and idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. deaths, asset 
loss). Therefore, the discussion in Malawi began by focusing on what was defined more 
broadly as ‘shock-sensitive social protection’ (3SP). The 3SP model assumes that helping 
vulnerable households (who are more likely to live in shock-prone and degraded 
environments in Malawi) reduce and address climate and other risks requires a combination 
                                                 
1  Both papers can be found at: www.ids.ac.uk/projects/programme-partnership-between-irish-aid-and-ids-on-social-
protection-and-food-security-and-nutrition/. 
2  The visit was undertaken by Daniel Longhurst between 22 September and 4 October 2018. The consultant would like to 
thank all those who supported the visit and agreed to be interviewed for the case study.  
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of short- and long-term interventions as well as creating systems that can ‘flex’ in response to 
shocks. It also necessitates ensuring that the core protection and consumption functions of 
social assistance programmes and service provision are sufficient (Holmes et al. 2017; 
Government of Malawi 2018d). The model recognises that combining interventions and 
systems also has the potential to increase efficiency and effectiveness, and promote 
adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacity – in short, to build resilience (Browne 
2014). In practice, as SRSP also has a focus on longer-term and ex ante measures, it shares 
many similarities to the concept of shock-sensitive social protection and to those of adaptive 
social protection (IDS 2018; O’Brien et al. 2018).  
 
At the global level, SRSP forms part of the policy and programmatic response to the priorities 
set out in the Grand Bargain, the World Humanitarian Summit and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). These agendas highlight the need to build national government 
capacity to respond to (increasingly protracted) crises, reduce programmatic fragmentation 
and growing humanitarian need,3 and achieve wider resilience outcomes for people, 
communities and institutions (Agenda for Humanity 2016; World Humanitarian Summit 
2016).  
 
 
2 Malawi overview 
Malawi is a low-income landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordered by Mozambique, 
Zambia and Tanzania. It has an estimated population of 18.6 million people in 2017 and an 
annual growth rate of 2.9 per cent, ranking eighteenth highest in the world (World Bank 
2018h, 2018a). A largely peaceful country, since transitioning to a democratic system in 1993 
Malawi has held five elections, the next scheduled for May 2019 (the timing of which is 
relevant for the advancement of the SRSP agenda, discussed in Section 3). Despite 
significant progress towards select Millennium Development Goals,4 including life expectancy 
increasing by 17 years since 1990 and fertility rates decreasing from 6.7 to 4.4 children per 
woman (UNDP 2018; World Bank 2018b), Malawi faces key development challenges. It is 
positioned 171 out of 189 on the Human Development Index (HDI),5 and has a gini 
coefficient of 43.9, ranking it 174 out of 187 in the world in terms of income equality (UNDP 
2013). Likewise, Malawi’s economy is largely unequal, undiversified, and centred 
predominantly on rain-fed agriculture which accounts for 80 per cent of livelihoods, 64 per 
cent of the formal work force, and around 28 per cent of the country’s GDP (Government of 
Malawi 2017a; World Bank 2018c). Poverty levels remain high, with 69.8 per cent of the 
population living below the international poverty line and one in every five Malawians living in 
ultra poverty on less than US$0.20 a day (World Bank 2016). 
 
Malawi has a temperate climate with good growing conditions, centred around two main 
seasons, the hot-wet season from October to March (which aligns with the lean season) and 
the cool-dry season for the rest of the year (FEWSNET 2018). However, the over-reliance on 
rain-fed subsistence farming makes the economy especially vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change and leaves the poorest particularly exposed to climate change, shocks and 
variability, as well as prevailing market conditions (United Nations in Malawi/Government of 
Malawi 2018). Cyclical lean seasons and unanticipated shocks also drive food insecurity and 
                                                 
3  This discussion is clearly also linked to donor fatigue at the size of humanitarian appeals worldwide, with the gap 
between purported need and available resources widening year on year, from US$5.5 billion in 2007 to US$20.5 billion 
in 2016 (an increase of 272 per cent), whilst the percentage of unmet needs steadily increased from 32 per cent to 
40 per cent (Development Initiatives 2017). 
4  In reducing child mortality, combating HIV, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and 
global partnerships for development (United Nations in Malawi/Government of Malawi 2018). 
5  With a value of 0.47, Malawi is below the average for countries in the low human development group (0.504), and for 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (0.537) (UNDP 2018).  
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can cause significant physical and economic damage.6 Trend analysis between 2003 and 
2014 showed that 20 out of 28 districts in Malawi experienced moderate to high recurrence 
of shocks (floods and drought), which is expected to increase in frequency and severity in the 
context of a changing climate (WFP 2014a), leading to profound impacts on food security 
and malnutrition. Thirty-seven per cent of children under five in Malawi are stunted, and for 
the last nine years an average of 1.73 million people have required humanitarian food 
assistance (in the form of in-kind or cash) during the lean season, from October to March. A 
historic peak of 6.7 million people (approximately 36 per cent of the population) required 
support following the effects of El Niño in 2016/17 (Government of Malawi 2017b). 
Circumstances are further exacerbated by accelerating deforestation and land degradation, 
resulting in the increased depletion of the natural resource base that impacts directly on 
human health, agriculture, and food and water security, and greater vulnerability of 
communities to natural hazards and calamities (Government of Malawi 2011).  
 
This combination of chronic and seasonal vulnerability, whilst complex, is nevertheless 
mostly known and predictable in Malawi. The fact that the country has consistently high 
annual humanitarian need during the lean season implies that a chronic problem is being 
addressed through an acute mechanism – the humanitarian response. This not only puts 
pressure on limited humanitarian resources, but also suggests the ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of using an ad hoc and temporary year-on-year response to address the root 
causes of multidimensional poverty and food insecurity, which arguably should be being 
addressed through longer-term programming. The context underlines the need for 
multisector, risk-informed approaches to the humanitarian–development nexus that build 
resilience at different levels and reduce the humanitarian caseload and cost over time, whilst 
gradually transferring capacity and responsibility to government-led systems and budget 
lines wherever possible, both for social protection and humanitarian delivery.  
 
This situation has led to the ‘Breaking the Cycle of Hunger’ agenda in Malawi since 2015. It 
has involved a discussion between the Government of Malawi (hereafter GoM) and 
development partners7 on how to address defining issues such as the distortions of the 
maize economy, the fragmented approach to resilience building and the lack of coordination 
across different partners, and building national capacity to respond to both chronic and acute 
food insecurity and poverty. This led to discussions around 3SP and SRSP, which then 
gained prominence in the Malawi National Social Support Programme (MNSSP II) and 
humanitarian response processes (the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) 
and Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme (JEFAP)).  The pressure to innovate and 
address need at scale during the El Niño response of 2016/17 also gave rise to a large 
number of SRSP trials, though some had started prior to this response.  
 
 
3 Relevant policy environment for SRSP 
3.1 Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS III) 
Malawi enjoys a reasonably coherent policy environment for development within which the 
aims and strategic direction of SRSP are outlined. The Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS III) (2017–22) outlines the overall development vision for the country and its 
links to international and regional commitments such as the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Social protection and 
social assistance programmes are referenced under different pillars of the MGDS III, related 
                                                 
6  For example, the historic flooding of 2015/16 affected 1,101,364 people, displaced 230,000 and killed 106, whilst 
causing approximately US$335 million of loss and damage (Government of Malawi/World Bank 2015). 
7  Development partners refers to all national and international partners outside of government – donors, UN agencies, 
(I)NGOs, academia, etc. 
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to improving nutrition and food security, building resilience and reducing disaster risk, 
supporting vulnerable populations, and enhancing social services (Government of Malawi 
2017a). However, prominence to social protection in the MGDS III as compared to the 
MGDS II appears to have diminished.  
 
3.2 Malawi National Social Support Programme II 
In Malawi, social protection is framed under the National Social Support Policy (NSSP) and 
the National Social Support Programme; the current iteration (MNSSP II) covers the period 
2018–23. The MNSSP II moves from a focus on individual programmes8 to a more coherent 
approach to achieving integrated coverage and building systems and resilience, and is the 
main vehicle for achieving Target 1.3 of the SDGs focused on the implementation of 
nationally appropriate social assistance programmes and systems for all by 2030 (World 
Bank 2018c). The MNSSP II is structured around three main pillars – consumption support; 
resilient livelihoods; and shock-sensitive social protection (3SP) – with two cross-cutting 
pillars on linkages and systems strengthening. Shock-sensitive social protection is defined in 
the MNSSP II as the ‘development of a… system that meets seasonal needs, prepares for 
and responds to unpredictable shocks in cooperation with the humanitarian sector and 
supports recovery and the return to regular programming’ (Government of Malawi 2018d: iii). 
The 3SP pillar is designed to interlink with the other pillars of the strategy and is now being 
operationalised through a work plan and a SRSP Learning Task Force (SRSP LTF), 
comprised of humanitarian and development actors and various departments of government.  
 
3.3 National Resilience Strategy (NRS) 
In 2016, the GoM (managed by the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA)) 
with support from development partners began the drafting of the National Resilience 
Strategy (NRS), in recognition of the fact that a multisectoral/ministerial strategy for resilience 
building was needed and could aid coordination of effort and investment from donors 
(Government of Malawi 2018b). The NRS provides a summary of the main programmes that 
contribute to resilience in Malawi, as well as a framework for improved coordination and 
implementation of activities (at the time of writing, a draft implementation plan was with the 
GoM for review.) The NRS includes reference to scalable social assistance programmes for 
shock response, and has two key pillars relevant to SRSP, namely Pillar 2 (Risk Reduction, 
Flood Control, and Early Warning and Response Systems) and Pillar 3 (Human Capacity, 
Livelihoods, and Social Protection). The linkage of these pillars for effective SRSP remains 
hypothetical until the NRS implementation plan is approved and the coordination structures 
mentioned therein are created. 
 
3.4 The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF: 2019–23) 
The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Malawi focuses on 
three interlinked areas aligned to the SDGs: (1) Peace, Inclusion and Effective Institutions; 
(2) Population Management and Inclusive Human Development; and (3) Inclusive and 
Resilient Growth. It is under the third pillar that SRSP sits, with outcome seven focused on 
household resilience and healthy ecosystems, and ‘intervention areas’ dedicated to disaster 
risk managed and the MNSSP II, with a specific aim for the UN to ‘interlink these two to 
advance 3SP’ (United Nations in Malawi/Government of Malawi 2018: 33). 
 
3.5 The National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) 
The National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) acts as the medium-term investment 
framework for the agricultural sector, building from the Agriculture Sector Wide Approach 
(ASWAp) and overarching National Agricultural Policy (NAP), covering the period 2018–22.  
                                                 
8  The traditional programmes of the NSSP were the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP), the public works 
programme (PWP), the school meals programmes (SMP), village savings and loans (VSL), and microfinance (MF). 
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It has four main programmes including Resilient Livelihoods and Agricultural Systems, and 
16 ‘investment areas’ including several areas related to SRSP such as ‘Food and Nutrition 
Security’, ‘Disaster Risk Management’, ‘Pest and Disease Management’, and ‘Natural 
Resource Management and Climate Change’ (Government of Malawi 2018c). However, 
despite the dominance and importance of agriculture in Malawi, it is unclear to what degree 
these priorities are coordinated within themselves or with other efforts in SRSP and DRM, 
and the role of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (MoAIWD) in 
social protection is less clear still. A consistent reflection from stakeholder discussions was 
the noted absence of MoAIWD in social protection, despite agricultural livelihoods and 
diversification being the key factor in building the resilience for the poorest and most 
vulnerable in face of climate change and shocks.9 The recent naming of MoAIWD as the 
deputy chair for the resilience and 3SP pillars under MNSSP II is therefore welcomed. 
 
3.6 The National Disaster Risk Management Policy 
Passed into law in 2015 (in part due to the wide-ranging effects of historic flooding at the 
beginning of the year), the National Disaster Risk Management Policy aims to move from a 
culture of disaster response to mainstream DRM into development planning and policies 
across sectors in order to reduce the impact of disasters, as well as enhance coordination 
and generate adequate budgetary allocations to DRM. As a top-line policy document, its 
implementation relies on other programmes (Government of Malawi 2016). 
 
3.7 Towards a Shock Sensitive Social Protection System in Malawi10 
Although not a national policy, the Overseas Development Institute/Red Cross Climate 
Centre study Towards a Shock Sensitive Social Protection System in Malawi (Holmes et al. 
2017) helped frame the discourse around shock-sensitive/responsive social protection and 
provided guidance on where to take policy and programme discussions in Malawi, including 
the shaping of the MNSSP II. It underlined that Malawi’s social assistance programmes had 
to address the effects of climate change and seasonality as a central priority to help the 
poorest and most vulnerable face consistent and predictable spikes in food and nutrition 
insecurity. Therefore, a form of scaling support had to be taken into the core design, planning 
and financing of social assistance programmes for the lean season, in addition to working on 
scalability measures for year-on-year emergency response caseloads, to reduce the scale of 
demand on emergency systems, complemented by prevention, preparedness, and 
resilience-building activities. To enable this, the study made several recommendations, such 
as to focus on strengthening core social protection systems (in part by integrating seasonal 
and shock-based scalability and response capacity into them), to agree on a vision as well as 
leadership and coordination and capacity requirements for the GoM, building up support 
systems to provide the backbone for 3SP, and to focus on increased financing and improved 
financing mechanisms for 3SP (Holmes et al. 2017). 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  The Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) is a good example of a potential social protection mechanism whose 
accountability, delivery, and targeting processes are nevertheless not sufficiently clear to harness its potential to 
become a viable SRSP mechanism. 
10  The study was overseen by the GoM and co-commissioned by GIZ, the World Bank and WFP. 
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4 Coordination and implementation of 
humanitarian response   
The Department of Disaster Risk Management Affairs (DoDMA), formerly under the Office of 
the President (OPC) but now moved to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, is 
responsible for coordinating the response to natural disasters. DoDMA coordinates with other 
ministries and international partners through the National Disaster Preparedness and Relief 
Committee, and then at Lilongwe (capital) level through the UN cluster system. At district 
level, depending on the size of response, clusters are also established, led and supported by 
their District Civil Protection Committees.  
 
The agricultural lean season (October to March, which coincides with the rains) dominates 
the humanitarian planning and response architecture in Malawi. It should be noted here that 
a discussion has begun in Malawi, as in other countries, as to how to term the lean season 
response – should it be called ‘humanitarian’ if it is predictable and seasonal? Can it be 
called otherwise if the need is so high that it demands a humanitarian intervention, 
regardless of its predictability? Other shocks such as flooding, pest infestations and strong 
winds can also have a significant impact and trigger ad hoc interventions. For instance, 
production of maize, the staple food for over 90 per cent of the population in Malawi and 
principle source of livelihood for the majority of farmers, is currently under threat by the 
invasion of Fall Armyworm (FAW), a pest that spread from West Africa in 2016/17 and has 
now infested almost the entire country, leading the GoM in 2017 to declare a state of disaster 
in 20 out of 28 districts (Reuters 2017; FAO 2018). 
 
The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) is charged with collecting primary 
data to assess food and nutrition insecurity on a yearly basis to provide overall figures of 
need for the lean season response and the duration of the response. A little confusingly, 
MVAC is also the name given to the lean season response itself. In 2017, the Integrated 
Phase Classification (IPC) system was introduced to Malawi, as it has been to other 
countries in Africa. The IPC is a secondary data ‘meta-analysis’ that incorporates primary 
data from the MVAC, SMART (nutrition) and market surveys, and provides a standardised 
estimation of food-insecure households in Malawi comparable across countries and 
classified into five phases: (1) None/Minimal, (2) Stressed, (3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, and 
(5) Humanitarian Catastrophe/Famine) (IPC 2012). Once the IPC has provided its estimation 
of food-insecure households per district (normally those in Phases 3–5 are targeted for 
humanitarian assistance depending on resources, available programmatic tools, etc.), the 
Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme (JEFAP) guidelines provide the community-
based targeting framework to drill down figures and obtain final household details for those to 
receive assistance. Amongst practitioners there has been ongoing debate regarding the 
consistent application, accuracy and degree of manipulation applied to the JEFAP 
methodology, which has been recently re-drafted and standardised but not formally released.  
 
The lean season response is usually split between the GoM, an INGO consortium, and the 
World Food Programme (WFP) and its NGO partners. Whilst there is a general push towards 
cash-based transfers and the ‘cash first’ principle, the majority of Malawi’s MVAC responses 
have been historically in-kind (food), though the use of cash is growing. MVAC beneficiaries 
receive rations calculated to the majority of food and nutrition needs for a family of 5.5 for a 
month, which currently can vary between US$20 and US$32 per month based on commodity 
prices (and which are monitored monthly). The MVAC humanitarian response is 
predominantly funded by international partners (although historically the government has 
provided sizeable in-kind contributions through the provision of maize). 
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5 Coordination and implementation of social 
protection 
Social protection is coordinated through a National Steering Committee, comprised of 
Principle Secretaries of GoM ministries, development partner Heads of Missions, and civil 
society and private sector representatives, chaired by the Chief Secretary of the OPC with 
the Poverty Reduction and Social Protection (PRSP) department of the Ministry of Finance, 
Economic Planning and Development (EP+D) providing secretariat functions. The National 
Steering Committee reports to the Parliamentary Committee on Social and Community 
Affairs. Under this committee sits a National Technical Committee that produces technical 
guidance and policy recommendations, followed by individual technical working groups 
(TWGs) for each pillar of the MNSSP, which are in the process of being reviewed. Alongside 
this is a SP donor coordination group. Aspects of this coordination structure are also being 
rethought with the finalisation and launch of the MNSSP II given its reformulation of the 
priority pillars (consumption support, resilience, 3SP, with cross-cutting pillars on 
strengthening systems and improving linkages), as well as a more general push to try to 
combine or streamline the number of coordination groups and committees at national and 
district levels in Malawi.11 Such coordination structures have helped advance a unified 
GoM/international partner agenda for SP. 
 
A 3SP Learning Task Force (SSSP LTF) has been created, co-chaired by PRSP and 
DoDMA with technical support from UNICEF and financial support from Irish Aid. Working 
with a consultant until November 2019, and building off the recommendations of the MNSSP 
II, its objectives are inter alia to reach consensus on how to operationalise 3SP (including 
shock response) with agreed division of roles, to institutionalise a government-led 
mechanism to coordinate humanitarian and social protection actors, and to identify GoM 
capacity requirements.  
 
In terms of implementation, whilst a large and diverse array of programmes could technically 
qualify as social protection in Malawi, the five main recognised programmatic pillars under 
the MNSSP are the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP), the public works programme 
(PWP), village savings and loans, microfinance and the school meals programme (SMP). 
Each has government-run and development partner-run versions. Only those that have 
trialled an activity related to SRSP are mentioned below. IFPRI also includes the FISP and 
humanitarian aid (food security and nutrition) in its summary of social assistance 
programmes in Malawi, which with 37 per cent and 32 per cent coverage respectively in 
2016/17 were very sizeable programmes (IFPRI 2018b), but given neither are designed to 
consistently, adequately and predictably target and protect the poorest and most vulnerable 
against shocks, they are not included in analysis here.  
 
5.1 The Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP)  
The SCTP (known in Malawi as Mtukula Pakhomo) assists ultra-poor and labour-constrained 
households through monthly or bi-monthly cash transfers. The programme is run by the 
Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability, and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW) with technical 
support from partners including UNICEF and Ayala Consulting Group and financial support 
                                                 
11  It was recently announced that the new pillars of the MNSSP II would be coordinated as follows: Pillar 1 – Ministry of 
Gender (lead), Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (deputy-lead); Pillars 2 and 3 – DoDMA (lead), Ministry 
of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (deputy-lead); Pillars 4 and 5 – EP&D (lead), Ministry of 
Civic Education, Culture and Community Development (deputy-lead). 
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from four principle donors who each fund separate SCTP districts12 – Irish Aid, the World 
Bank, the EU (through KFW), and KFW (the German development bank). 
 
The SCTP currently reaches 210,000 households in 26 districts, with the aim of reaching 
319,000 households or 1,754,500 beneficiaries by end-2018, totalling 12 per cent of the 
population and 40 per cent of the ultra-poor (World Bank 2018c; Government of Malawi 
2018c). On average, a household on SCTP receives 7,000 Malawi kwacha (MWK) per month 
(currently just over US$9.5), aimed at reducing poverty and smoothing consumption amongst 
ultra-poor and labour-constrained households, increasing school enrolment for children, and 
improving nutrition (Government of Malawi 2018a). The SCTP is one of the most thoroughly 
researched social assistance programmes of its kind, which indicates very significant impacts 
on consumption, livelihoods, schooling outcomes and local economy multipliers13 (World 
Bank 2018c; Government of Malawi et al. 2018c). 
 
5.2 Public works and asset creation programmes 
Malawi’s principle public works programme (PWP) has operated under the Malawi Social 
Action Fund (MASAF), funded by the World Bank and implemented by the Local 
Development Fund (LDF) since 1998, with a principle focus on labour-intensive public works. 
Its latest iteration, MASAF IV, focuses on an integrated package of public works, livelihoods 
and savings programmes, supporting the SCTP in 11 districts, and simultaneously rolling out 
the Unified Beneficiary Register (UBR), Malawi’s social registry, in the same 11 SCTP 
districts (World Bank 2018d, 2018e).  
 
At the time of writing, the MASAF IV was reaching 950,000 households (approximately 5.2 
million people) with the last round of payments expected in the last quarter of 2018. 
Participants currently undertake two cycles of 24 days per year over three years (October–
December and April–July), and receive 600 MWK per day for a total of 14,400 MWK per 
cycle (although wages have recently been raised to 900 MWK per working day). Whilst 
having had generally broad support in Malawi, the public works component has met with 
difficulties including addressing food security (Beegle, Galasso and Goldberg 2015), and 
having to substantially cut targets for emergency public works (from 902,000 to 450,000 
beneficiaries) due to implementation issues (World Bank 2018f). The World Bank has also 
noted that the public works component would be drastically scaled back at the end of 2018 to 
a smaller pilot across ten districts and approximately 10,000 households with GIZ in 2019, 
focused on watershed management (the project is still under design). Meanwhile the Local 
Development Fund (LDF) has been merged into the Local Government Financial Committee 
under the Ministry of Local Government. This clearly will leave a very large gap in Malawi’s 
social assistance programme coverage, and require a rethink in terms of provision for the 
poorest. 
 
The other major asset creation programme is WFP’s Food Assistance for Assets (FFA), 
which currently reaches 131,000 households (723,000 beneficiaries) across ten districts, with 
plans to scale to 170,000 households by end 2018. Beneficiaries currently work for 12 days 
in a month over six months (outside of the lean season and harvest periods, from July to 
December), receiving an equivalent of US$20 per month (the daily/monthly dollar rate is 
taken from the total food basket requirements for an average family of 5.5, divided by the 
number of days worked). With a focus on building resilience over multiple years through 
different interventions, the FFA approach is much more intensive and costly than the PWP of 
                                                 
12  Irish Aaid (Balaka/Ntcheu), the World Bank (Nkhata Bay/Dedza/Lilongwe/Dowa/Nchisi/Kasungu/Nkotakota/ 
Rumphi/Karonga/Blantyre/Chiradzulu), the EU (through KFW) (Nsanje/Chikwawa/Mulanje/Zomba/Neno/ 
Mwanza/Mzimba), and KFW (Chitipa/Likoma/Mchinji/Salima/Mangochi/Machinga/Phalombe). 
13  An FAO evaluation showed that for each cent transferred to a household as a cash transfer there was a multiplier effect 
of 50 per cent in the local community (Government of Malawi et al. 2018). 
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the government, and there are not yet external evaluations of FFA in Malawi, although wider 
global evaluations of FFA have shown positive results in building resilience though mixed 
results for achieving food security (WFP 2014b). This shows a diverse picture for asset 
creation programme coverage in Malawi, with different objectives, work norms, and transfer 
values. The PRSP, with the support of GIZ and WFP, is currently attempting to harmonise 
approaches through a joint task force. 
 
5.3 Schools meals programmes (SMP) 
There are currently two main SMP providers in Malawi – Mary’s Meals, which reaches 
around a million children (Mary’s Meals 2018), and WFP that also reaches a million children 
nationwide in 786 primary schools, with WFP also providing a home ration to some schools 
programme (WFP 2018b). The SMP is the only social assistance programme in Malawi that 
is required by government directive to have universal coverage. 
 
 
6 Overview of SRSP activities in Malawi 
Utilising or running parallel to the above-mentioned programmes, Malawi has trialled various 
SRSP mechanisms from 2015 to date. These are outlined below, presented in chronological 
sequence. Instead of providing individual findings for each trial, details of summary findings 
and reflections both from the studies and from the mission follow in Section 7. 
 
6.1 Single delivery mechanism/Mchinji trial (‘Piggybacking’) 
Efforts to harmonise approaches to cash transfers for social protection and humanitarian 
purposes began in the 2015/16 lean season in Mchinji district through ‘the single delivery 
mechanism’ trial (hereafter referred to as the Mchinji trial) (Concern Worldwide, 2016). The 
aim was to assess the systemic bottlenecks, incentive challenges, delays or time-savings of 
using a joint delivery process for social cash transfer (SCT) and MVAC payments as part of 
an integrated social protection system. Six traditional authorities (TAs – a sub-district 
administrative unit) in Mchinji were chosen where the financial service provider was the same 
for both SCT and MVAC (in this case Airtel Mobile Money).  
 
The intention was for SCT households to continue to receive their SCT payment (delivered 
every two months in Mchinji), whilst also receiving a monthly MVAC cash transfer,14 with the 
aim of aligning delivery dates when they occurred in the same month. SCT resources would 
be channelled as normal through the MoGCDSW to Airtel, whilst MVAC resources would be 
sent from the lead NGO of the NGO consortium for MVAC (Save the Children) directly to 
Airtel and through them to the SCT e-payment beneficiaries. Non-SCTP beneficiaries eligible 
for MVAC support would receive their MVAC cash transfer also through Airtel. Concern 
Worldwide was the implementing NGO in Mchinji and led on targeting and monitoring, with 
support from WFP’s real time mobile technology survey for remote food security (MVAM) 
system, which provided information on household food coping strategies, prices and market 
behaviour and perceptions/sentiments (Concern Worldwide, 2016).  
 
Only a small number of sample households15 participated in the trial (56 out of a possible 
2,353) due to: (1) technological difficulties reconciling databases and removing duplications, 
and (2) targeting to receive both SCTP/MVAC was voluntary and there is a strong principle in 
Malawi around ‘no double dipping’ (meaning no one should benefit from two programmes 
simultaneously, an issue revisited again in Section 7) (Concern Worldwide, 2016).  
                                                 
14  The MVAC payment at that time was 16,950 Malawi kwacha (MWK) per month, against an average of approximately 
3,500–4,000 MWK for SCTP, a significant difference in values which can be potentially disruptive for the objectives of 
social assistance programmes and the perceptions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.  
15  Findings for the trial were summarised by Concern World Wide but not made public. 
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6.2 Automatic inclusion (‘shadow alignment’) 
The 2016/17 effects of El Niño hit Malawi hardest in the Southern Africa region, and came on 
the back of compound crises in 2014/15 and 2015/16 (poor harvests and historic flooding) 
that led to a national maize deficit of one million metric tons and a rise in domestic maize 
prices of 60 per cent above the three-year average (Government of Malawi 2017b; IFPRI 
2018a). This led the GoM in April 2016 to declare a State of National Disaster: 6.7 million 
people (36 per cent of the population) in 24 of 28 districts were identified as needing 
humanitarian support from July 2016 to June 2017, making the El Niño response the largest 
and longest in Malawi’s history. The pressure to address large-scale need and align systems 
more effectively also drove several SRSP innovations. 
 
For the 2016/17 response, the decision was jointly taken between the social protection actors 
and the Humanitarian Response Committee, the highest decision-making group in Malawi, 
comprised of government and international partner representatives, to ‘automatically include’ 
all SCTP beneficiaries in the MVAC response in drought-affected areas. Jointly implemented 
by DoDMA, MoGCDSW, WFP and the INGO consortium, with the overall coordination 
support and learning agenda led by UNICEF, all shock-affected SCTP households were 
integrated into the MVAC targeting and distribution processes nationwide to also receive the 
MVAC ration, leading to 132,916 SCTP households being included in the MVAC caseload. 
The process was closely followed through a range of monitoring mechanisms including key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions, an e-survey and monitoring at distribution 
points (Government of Malawi/UNICEF 2017).  
 
6.3 Shock-responsive asset creation and school meals programmes during El 
Niño 
In addition to automatic inclusion, other key efforts were made by the humanitarian 
community in response to El Niño to make their programmes shock responsive.  
 
WFP’s FFA programme, as well as asset creation and input programmes organised by the 
INGO consortium, both expanded to reach additional participants. Learning from previous 
MVAC responses, WFP implemented Complementary Productive Asset Creation (CPAC) 
activities, expanding them both in duration for existing participants and through the adoption 
of new participants under MVAC, tailoring work norms and activities accordingly. The INGO 
consortium meanwhile began activities further in advance of the start of the lean season, 
focused on enhancing agricultural productivity. This approach from WFP and the INGO 
consortium reached 235,235 MVAC households in 20 districts and 9,848 MVAC households 
in ten districts respectively, undertaking activities including backyard gardening, contour 
ridging, tree planting, and providing agricultural inputs (WFP/INGO Consortium 2017a). 
 
In addition, an expanded emergency school meals programme (ESMP) was coordinated 
through the Education Cluster, led by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 
and implemented by WFP, which scaled WFP’s existing programme to reach an additional 
61,892 beneficiaries in 71 schools across four districts for the duration of the response, 
providing in-kind take home rations (THRs) (WFP/INGO Consortium 2017b; Government of 
Malawi 2017b). Monitoring showed that school enrolment increased by 20 per cent 
(compared to a decrease of 12 per cent in control groups) and attendance exceeded 90 per 
cent (compared to the control group that remained at 60–70 per cent) (WFP/INGO 
Consortium 2017b). However, since the trial, there has not been institutionalisation of the 
ESMP approach. 
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6.4 Vertical Expansion (VE) trial 
Based on a review of evidence from both the Mchinji and automatic inclusion trials, in 
2017/18 the GoM tested vertical expansion (VE) of the SCTP, providing emergency top-ups 
for 3,073 SCTP households (approximately 16,594 individuals) in drought-affected Balaka 
district, which was identified by MVAC16 using the regular SCTP payment method and 
provider. Balaka was chosen because it was one of only two SCTP districts utilising e-
payments (through the financial service provider First Merchant Bank (FMB)), meaning 
beneficiaries received payments on a monthly basis (as opposed to bi-monthly for manual 
payments). Top-up transfer values mirrored those for the humanitarian response, meaning in 
addition to SCTP payments (the average at that point was around 7,000 MWK per month per 
household), they received for the four-month MVAC period an additional 13,500 MWK 
(approximately US$18.5) per month (UNICEF/WFP 2018a). 
 
The VE trial was managed at national level by PRSP together with DoDMA (which guided the 
design of the operational trial and coordinated communications from national to district level), 
with the support of UNICEF and WFP (for technical backstopping on the SP and 
humanitarian sides respectively). The MoGCDSW drove implementation, with GoM 
extension workers and Community Social Support Committees (CSSCs) undertaking 
activities on the ground, whilst training, targeting and monitoring support was provided by 
CARE (on the SP side) and United Purpose (on the MVAC side). Financial support for the 
transfers/top-ups and partners was provided by Irish Aid and for the learning process by the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID). FMB transferred the top-ups to 
households with their regular SCTP payments, which beneficiaries could access from either 
an ATM or a mobile bank van once a month (UNICEF/WFP 2018a). At the end of the 
process, UNICEF/WFP also produced with the GoM detailed operational guidance for 
implementing future VE. 
 
6.5 Predictive targeting (‘horizontal expansion’) 
To develop the thinking around horizontal expansion, starting in 2017 Concern Worldwide in 
partnership with CARD, CADECOM and WFP, and with the financial support of ECHO, 
explored a combination of activities. The project registered 41,209 households in disaster-
prone areas of Mangochi and Nsanje districts (22,166 and 19,043 households in Mangochi 
and Nsanje respectively) and entered them onto WFP’s digitised management information 
system (MIS) and delivery platform SCOPE. ‘At risk’ households were pre-targeted through 
an adjusted targeting methodology using a combination of elements from the UBR, JEFAP, 
and SCTP targeting tools, plus Concern Worldwide’s own door-to-door wealth ranking 
exercise. This was then combined with a hazard mapping exercise to identify shock-prone 
‘hotspots’ with the support of District Civil Protection Committees (DCPCs), cross-compared 
with drone footage and GIS mapping of the households, creating a final list ranking 
households from one to five in terms of poverty and food insecurity in the highest risk areas 
for flooding. In the end, the approach was not tested as a flood did not take place during the 
pilot period, although Concern Worldwide is finalising a counterfactual assessment to 
ascertain if the process would have achieved efficiency gains. 
 
From a SRSP perceptive, the end goal would be to integrate this learning and humanitarian 
DRM experience into the targeting and systems development for social protection, such as 
the UBR, to enable future horizontal expansion. The poorest and most food insecure 
households in shock-prone ‘hotspots’ can be pre-identified and ‘tagged’ in the UBR, then 
when a shock hits, either automatically or after a post-shock rapid assessment, households 
can be provided assistance. As the UBR is not an end-to-end delivery system, a separate 
                                                 
16  The total MVAC caseload for Balaka for the 2016/17 lean season was 15,144 households in IPC Phase 3 or worse; 
however given VE was a trial, those SCTP households receiving VE support were not deducted from the humanitarian 
caseload as per MVAC, although this would be the intention in the future. 
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MIS and delivery partner is required (in this case SCOPE for the MIS and a pre-identified 
security firm) (Concern Worldwide/COOPI 2018). 
 
6.6 UBR/national ID/MVAC database 
The GoM as part of its system strengthening agenda for social protection has been investing 
in the development of beneficiary management systems. To this end it began piloting the 
Unified Beneficiary Registry (UBR), a social registry designed to support and harmonise 
outreach, targeting, eligibility and registration processes using its beneficiary list, therefore 
reducing duplication of effort and providing an overall picture as to who is benefiting from 
which programmes and where. Programmes can apply targeting criteria to the UBR or use its 
poverty list (ranked using a proxy means test (PMT)) to identify eligible households. As in 
other countries, the UBR is not designed to replace the operational processes and MIS 
systems of each programme, which would still apply different targeting criteria and require 
their own beneficiary information, case management and payroll systems, etc.  
 
Piloting of the UBR began in two districts in 2015 (Dedza and Nkhata Bay), capturing the 
demographic and socioeconomic data for the poorest 50 per cent of households, to be 
updated every four years in a census-style format. This expanded to 13 districts in 2016, 
then to 28 as part of the concurrent expansion of the SCTP. A harmonised data collection 
tool with approximately 50 questions was developed after consultation with development 
partners and programmes in Malawi to ensure sufficient information was gathered to enable 
different actors to use the UBR in the future. One point appears pertinent for SRSP: the UBR 
is the only social registry in the world aiming to register 100 per cent of its population. 
Although certainly useful (as shocks can affect rich and poor alike), this could become costly 
to maintain if information is updated yearly – as needed for the purposes of shock response.  
 
6.6.1 The UBR/MVAC trial 
Given that there is no central humanitarian database, with registration and case 
management undertaken by individual humanitarian actors year on year, in 2017 a trial 
aimed to assess the potential operational benefits of using the UBR to support the 
humanitarian response targeting processes and beneficiary management. It was conducted 
in Dedza district in two TAs over the course of the 2016/17 humanitarian response by a 
multi-partner technical team which worked with the government’s UBR task force, supported 
on the ground by WFP and United Purpose. In one of the selected TAs the list provided by 
the UBR was ranked using the PMT, and in the other, the list was left unranked. Then the 
regular JEFAP community targeting process was followed, but first reading the names off the 
list (either ranked or unranked), and then asking the communities whether people should be 
included for MVAC or not, and whether additional names should be added (WFP/United 
Purpose 2017). 
 
6.6.2 Linking the UBR to national ID 
The GoM with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2017 
rolled out national ID, registering every adult over 16 and providing them with photo ID and a 
unique identification number as well as recording core demographic information in 
coordination with the National Registration Bureau, held on an e-wallet. Registration will 
continue yearly, and the first linkage of the ID with voter registration is being tested for this 
year’s national elections. The beneficiary unique identification number will be used to 
populate the UBR to help ensure, once MISs are aligned in the future, that a consistent 
record is kept of who is receiving what across different programmes. This relies on other SP 
programmes to capture and record the national ID number in their registration processes, 
whether or not they use the UBR. 
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However, the lack of a common database for MVAC leaves a systems and knowledge gap 
for SRSP, as it will not be possible to know who has received humanitarian support year on 
year. Even after the UBR has hopefully moved to 100 per cent registration of households in 
approximately four years (if plans stay on track), as noted there is no plan or funds as yet 
allocated for the regular updating of this information. In any case, every programme still 
requires its own MIS for operations (case management, reporting/reconciliation, payments) 
independent from the UBR, and because this does not exist for MVAC it makes future SRSP 
efforts potentially more cumbersome. 
 
6.7 Weather index-based insurance (WII)/forecast-based action (FBA) 
In terms of ‘risk layering’ (identifying the risks populations face in a given context and 
matching these to programmatic coverage and capacity), insurance plays a theoretically 
important role in the wider landscape of SRSP, albeit with several caveats. For instance, 
insurance can be expensive, complex, does not come prior to a shock, and insurance 
providers are often reluctant to cover poorer individuals (and poorer households are reluctant 
to invest hard-earned income in something that does not provide a guaranteed return). 
However, given that SRSP must sit within a broader landscape of prevention, adaptation and 
risk reduction strategies to be truly effective, insurance has a clear role to play by transferring 
risk for large-scale events to an insurance provider. Weather index-based insurance (WII) is 
designed to reduce some of the complexities around insurance provision by using satellite 
observational data, such as for rainfall, as a proxy for losses in production, with automatic 
payouts triggered if rainfall dips below pre-agreed thresholds during key periods of the 
cropping calendar. WII systems have the advantage of lower administrative costs and are 
less technically complex than traditional crop insurance, but are nevertheless exposed to 
various weaknesses such as basis risk (a mismatch between actual loss and that of the 
insurance policy (indemnity)) (World Bank 2012; Churchill and Matul 2012). Malawi has 
dabbled with different forms of WII from the small scale, such as the World Bank working 
with the National Association of Small Farmers (World Bank 2012), through to the large scale 
when the GoM signed up for a sovereign WII scheme under Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) for 
the 2015/16 agricultural season.17  At medium scale, WFP’s Rural Resilience (R4) 
programme has slowly grown, combining asset creation, village savings and loans, credit 
and index-based insurance for 39,000 participants for the 2018/19 season (WFP 2018a). 
Whilst combining WII with other social assistance programmes could prove part of an 
effective risk layering exercise, the long-term evidence of WII’s contribution to resilience 
building for the most vulnerable, as well as its sustainability, still needs to be provided in this 
highly innovative area.  
 
Alongside WII, WFP and the GoM (DoDMA, PRSP, and the Department for Climate Change 
and Meteorological Services (DCCMS)), DFID and external partners are looking to integrate 
forecast-based action (FBA) to social assistance programmes and humanitarian response 
design. FBA is defined as ‘the use of climate or other forecasts to trigger funding and action 
prior to a shock or before acute impacts are felt’ (Wilkinson et al. 2018). In Malawi, work has 
begun on building a FBA system and working with partners to establish criteria to objectively 
trigger different actions ahead of shocks. The advantage of FBA in the context of SRSP is 
the ability to link scalable social assistance programmes to climate forecasting, and define 
objective triggers to respond in advance of shocks, saving time and money as well as 
potentially changing beneficiary behaviour and investments. As the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) notes, FBA is an area of significant growth in disaster risk management that 
includes the private sector (ibid.). This in turn requires improving the quality and timing of 
climate information and services to support impact analysis by sector and triggers for action 
                                                 
17  The ARC experience was not deemed particularly successful for Malawi, as the model developed under the policy did 
not initially trigger a payout. This fell during the El Niño humanitarian response when need was particularly high. After 
an investigation, ARC provided Malawi with a one-off ‘humanitarian’ payment of US$8.1 million (Africa Risk Capacity 
2016), but the GoM to date has not reapplied for an ARC policy.  
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prior to a lean season linked to early warning systems. Climate services are being supported 
by several partners at national and local level including UNDP, WFP and FAO. 
 
6.8 Other donors efforts around SRSP 
EU PROACT – Pro-Resilience Action (Pro-ACT) is a three-year programme funded by the 
European Union until 2020. It is led by United Purpose (UP) in a consortium with Save the 
Children and Concern Worldwide and targets all SCT beneficiaries in Mulanje, Zomba and 
Nsanje (35,461 households) with resilience-building interventions, including trialling a lean 
season ‘top-up’ and a crisis modifier mechanism. The seasonal top-up between November 
and February will be provided to those SCT beneficiaries who are identified as extremely 
labour constrained within the SCT cohort and cannot participate in income generating 
activities, with an average total transfer cost of approximately 10 euros per household per 
month, made in two double payments (PRO-ACT 2018a; 2018bT). After the first lean season 
2018/19, the approach will be re-assessed and hopefully aligned and standardised with 
others in Malawi, as currently it does not sit within systems and structures of government. 
 
DFID is also in the process of defining a multi-year resilience programme with the UN and 
various partners that will have significant components on social assistance programmes and 
shock response. Likewise USAID and DFID, as part of its multi-year resilience support to 
WFP, have previously supported scaling their resilience interventions in the face of shocks, 
most notably for the El Niño response (see Section 6.3). Both DFID and USAID are also 
principle donors for the MVAC humanitarian response. 
 
 
7 Summary of lessons learned 
The various SRSP trials in Malawi have generated a lot of evidence and lessons learned that 
are relevant to national and international SRSP discussions. These 13 key lessons are 
summarised below.  
 
7.1 Policy coherence and political economy for SRSP  
The link between climate change adaptation, disaster risk management, humanitarian 
response, and social protection (SP) are consistently referenced across all the major policy 
frameworks in Malawi, providing good anchorage and rationale for SRSP. As has been 
shown above, this is being mirrored by several concrete on-the-ground initiatives. However, it 
could be argued that a more definitive indication of where SP sits in the GoM’s wider 
development priorities is reflected in overall expenditure, where, according to the World 
Bank, the government spent an average of 0.6 per cent of GDP on SP programmes between 
2011 and 2016, very low even by comparison to the rest of Africa which stands at 1.2 per 
cent (World Bank 2018c). The vast majority of SP funding is provided by the international 
community, as is the case for the humanitarian response. 
 
Despite advances in an enabling policy environment for SRSP, its potential for success 
should be seen within the broader political economy of Malawi which is still predominantly 
maize-based and which is built around various structural and seasonal characteristics that 
favour key powerbrokers. These characteristics include yearly peaks and troughs in maize 
prices linked to (i) seasonality and supply and demand (such as MVAC and the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) requirements); (ii) the downward 
pressure effect of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) on farm-gate prices; and (iii) the 
select application of export bans through the Control of Goods Act, etc. (Chinsinga 2012; 
Said and Singini 2014). Although more research is needed, these factors no doubt influence 
GoM budgetary allocations to development programmes, possibly made more complex by 
the fact that SRSP favours a move towards harmonised and ideally cash-based approaches 
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as opposed to in-kind. Partners in Malawi also noted that with national elections due in May 
2019, the MVAC response for 2018/19 ran the risk of becoming a highly politicised and 
instrumentalised process, and it was unclear to what degree the official assessments of need 
(MVAC/IPC) would be followed, or to what extent international donors would provide support. 
 
Likewise, a comprehensive policy environment does not automatically lead to coordinated 
programmatic effort, and one constant observation from discussions for this study was the 
difficulty of ensuring a coherent programmatic response on the ground for a variety of 
different multisectoral initiatives, including SRSP. There is a risk that SRSP’s aim to create 
greater harmonisation and convergence between humanitarian and development initiatives 
clearly has the potential in a context of limited coordination capacity to drive further 
fragmentation, especially at field level, as an increasingly diverse set of partners promote 
their programmes as ‘shock responsive’.  
 
7.2 SRSP and basic social assistance programme functionality 
A common issue raised in SRSP discussions is whether the topic distracts from ensuring the 
basic functionality of social assistance programmes. This is consistently raised in discussions 
in Malawi; however, there appears to be widespread acceptance of SRSP as a national 
priority. Discussions during the mission highlighted that nationwide delivery of SCTP now 
appears on track, with the focus moving to consider whether the basic transfer is sufficient 
when considered against seasonal fluctuations in need, prices, etc. Hence, a distinction is 
being made between (predictable) seasonal top-ups and (unpredictable) shock-based top-
ups. Likewise the principal donors in Malawi are becoming much more reluctant to fund two 
separate systems (humanitarian and SP) for mostly predictable need, given the duplication of 
cost, effort and potential for diversion or fraud that it may entail. 
  
That said, the effort required to coordinate and align humanitarian and SP systems with 
different principles, operating procedures, accountability measures, geographic coverage, 
operating systems, and resourcing is considerable. The 3SP Learning Task Force is a 
welcome process in Malawi and will require broad-based support from ministries and 
principal international partners if it is to move from a learning to a coordination body. The fact 
that most government programmes under the MNSSP II are cash-based, and that the 
humanitarian response still uses considerable in-kind resources, requires a strategy to bridge 
the two for the short to medium term. 
 
7.3 Next steps for scaling expandable social assistance programmes and 
systems 
The VE trial of 2017/18, along with other trials mentioned herein, have noted some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of scaling SCTP vertically in the face of shocks. There is clear 
potential to scale SCTP in the future, whilst noting certain caveats. These include: (i) the 
need to adapt the SCTP MIS to capture disaggregated information on SCTP households 
receiving VE top-ups; (ii) expanding SCTP e-payment architecture (which currently only 
covers two of the 28 districts); and (iii) linking to a wider disaster risk financing strategy and 
system (such as the Social Support Fund (SSF), and the previewed disaster risk financing 
work between the World Bank and EP+D). On the mechanics of the VE process, including 
linking the IPC assessment to trigger VE, substantial detail is contained in the VE operational 
guidance created by the GoM, UNICEF and WFP (UNICEF/WFP 2018c).  
 
Until now, discussions have focused on VE for slow onset shocks. Further steps could 
involve understanding the range of shocks faced by Malawi, as well as which mechanisms 
are best suited to respond to them (for instance, looking at horizontal expansion for floods or 
covariate shocks, considering other financial instruments such as World Bank catastrophe 
bonds (CAT-DDOs) or insurance mechanisms, etc.). Whilst Malawi may have limited 
capacity or desire to address all of these at present, mapping them out to provide a vision for 
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all stakeholders (sometimes referred to as risk layering), then addressing each over time, 
could help further with coherence and coordination.  
 
7.4 Viewing vulnerability through the lens of seasonality 
Climate shocks in Malawi are largely predictable (although the pattern is different between 
shocks). As noted in the ODI 3SP study, the majority of ‘humanitarian’ responses are not for 
unanticipated humanitarian crises, but rather addressing chronic vulnerability that peaks 
during the lean season (Holmes et al. 2017). This has raised anew the discussion in Malawi 
around what terms to give to the response, and how to address need efficiently and 
effectively. A humanitarian response can do much to bridge the divide with longer-term 
programming (IFPRI 2018a), but reframing the context around seasonality also reconsiders 
which programmatic response is most appropriate, with greater emphasis on looking at entry 
points multi-annually (Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler and Longhurst (2013).  
 
As crises occur over two-year cycles (at a minimum), with a poor agricultural season (which 
is also the lean season in Malawi) driving up need for the next lean season response, 
anticipatory action has two windows – one related to improving the current agricultural 
production season (actions up to 12 months in advance of the next shock), the other related 
to anticipatory interventions employed in the months or weeks leading up to a lean season. 
Currently, most attention is focused on the latter, linked to the MVAC/IPC results released in 
August/September for a response that can start in October/November, driving up the cost of 
response and leading to actions which arguably only help to provide basic consumption 
support and buffer against the worst impacts of the lean season. However, a seasonal top-up 
could be designed with different criteria in mind, with smaller values and earlier timings not 
tied to a humanitarian response, or larger one-off transfers provided for agricultural 
investment prior to the growing season (or the school terms, or other household priorities).18 
Then potentially additional vertical (or horizontal) expansion could be provided during the 
peak of the lean season for food and nutrition security needs, the MVAC architecture only 
being employed when this capacity is exceeded.19  
 
Thinking seasonally, therefore, interrogates definitions of efficiency versus effectiveness. The 
Mchinji/VE trials showed that using one delivery mechanism for two different types of transfer 
during a lean season response can be efficient (saving time and money), but the 
effectiveness of this approach in terms of outcomes for recipients is less clear20 (and in any 
case would need longer-term evaluation). Providing top-ups aligned to the seasonal calendar 
(in terms of timing and value) could move the discussion towards effectiveness, linking to 
one of the higher-level outcomes of SRSP, reducing the humanitarian burden over time by 
reducing the drivers of poverty and food insecurity. More research into seasonally 
appropriate top-ups is recommended (UNICEF has work underway), taking into account 
important periods such as agricultural investment, school terms, the start of negative coping, 
annual inflation rates for key commodities, peaks in clinic admissions for communicable 
diseases, and peaks in food and nutrition insecurity, etc.  
 
                                                 
18  Beneficiaries in the VE trial noted top-ups during the lean season helped them stay in their fields and not look for 
piecemeal work elsewhere, but they noted that earlier transfers would have helped with improved investment options 
and reduced negative coping strategies. The trial showed that negative coping reaches a peak one month before the 
recommended start date of MVAC (UNICEF/WFP 2018a). 
19  The top-up for VE was not nutrition sensitive, whereas the MVAC transfer provides additional cash or in-kind support for 
pregnant and lactating women.  
20  The VE trial showed that aside from the food consumption score (FCS), other key indicators (dietary diversity (DDS), 
emergency livelihood strategies (iCSI), etc.) showed less positive distinctions between sample and control groups. 
However, VE households did show a higher tendency to invest, for instance in livestock or repaying debts, than those 
only receiving MVAC support (UNICEF/WFP/018a).  
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7.5 Flexible financing, financing mechanisms, and financial sustainability 
Resourcing SRSP touches on two key issues – who pays, and how do they pay? Should 
humanitarian donors pay for VE top-ups, or should regular SP donors create contingency 
funds? Discussions during the mission tended to show that each ‘side’ thought the other 
should pick up the bill.21 Using ad hoc humanitarian funding to provide shock-based top-ups 
through SP structures may seem feasible, but given both humanitarian donor conditionality 
and very limited and unreliable resources, this may prove unsustainable. More research is 
recommended as to donor requirements (both SP and humanitarian) for the use of their 
funds in both contexts, in terms of public financial management, reporting, timeliness and 
accountability. A likely double solution of contingent funding under the regular SCT 
programme, with aligned humanitarian funding for unpredictable additional shocks, may 
prove most viable.  
 
Likewise, combining funding sources in the same financial service provider (FSP) has proven 
feasible and efficient; albeit at small scale and only where the FSP has coverage. In terms of 
financing mechanisms, the preferred avenue identified under the NSSP and MNSSP II is the 
SSF, which is only in concept stage, but is proposed to act as a pooled fund for social 
assistance programmes and to include a contingent financing window (O’Neill and Hall 
2016). To advance the SSF, SCTP donors would need to agree to pool their resources 
(reporting against different districts for different donors could be retained), with an 
appropriate fund management and reporting mechanism designed.  
 
What was clear from both the Mchinji and VE trials in Malawi was that Irish Aid’s flexibility as 
a donor was unique in a few key ways: 
 
 Irish Aid provided funds for both the regular transfers and the top-ups, and in addition 
was willing to channel both forms of support through government systems. The regular 
transfers were channelled through the GoM centralised holding account, whereas the 
top-ups were sent straight to the GoM-managed district account for the FSP, which 
delivered both at the same time.  
 When faced with difficulties providing exact budget figures for VE in September (owing 
to the time it takes to process IPC figures (released in September) into confirmed 
MVAC participants in November, an issue that will likely arise every year), Irish Aid 
accepted a much higher global budget and reduced it later, and tentatively proposed 
using the roll-over budget for an expanded VE trial in 2019. This demonstrated the 
advantages of multi-year planning not usually open to humanitarian donors and 
implementing partners. 
 
Funding SRSP also raises the question of sustainability. Currently, the GoM is responsible 
for SCT payments in only one district of Malawi (Thyolo). Adding seasonal or unanticipated 
shock-based top-ups to the basic payment structure potentially adds further demands of the 
GoM which it will not be in a position to adopt financially. Linking to a wider disaster risk 
financing strategy, such as the one currently being discussed by the World Bank, could 
provide the coherence for guiding regular and shock-based payments, as well as hopefully 
move forward fiscal space discussions with the GoM around SP. 
 
7.6 Cost–benefit analysis for SRSP 
Whilst some literature investigates the cost of early versus late response to shocks (work 
which started with DFID analysis in Ethiopia (DFID 2016)), and some work is emerging 
around the use of scalable social assistance programmes for shocks (several are collected 
for instance in World Bank 2018g), generally international SRSP literature emphasises that 
                                                 
21  Especially around SCTP. Other proposed approaches, such as the upcoming DFID resilience programme, may 
implement both regular and top-up payments through the same provider/partner from the same source. 
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there is a big cost–benefit evidence gap (O’Brien et al. 2018). In Malawi, UNICEF and WFP 
undertook a Return on Investment (RoI) analysis that looked at the current capacity of the 
SCTP system to scale-up to shocks as compared with the same system after certain 
capacity enhancing investments (UNICEF/WFP 2018b). The model did not assess or 
compare the costs of current SCTP and MVAC responses, as it did not have comparable 
data at the stage of modelling to do so. The report found that across a range of measures 
there could be cost savings over a ten-year period ranging from US$290,000 to US$1.3 
million. Whilst important for decision-making, the range of caveats required for these forms of 
cost–benefit analysis indicate that caution is required in interpreting results (different 
variables for modelling include the type of shock, the maturity of a SP system, the overheads 
for different modality types, the infrastructure required to deliver effectively, the availability 
and timing of financing, etc.). 
 
7.7 Harmonised support systems 
All the Malawi trials reported high technical backstopping requirements, time delays and 
support costs often as a result of non-aligned (or non-existent) databases. Since SRSP 
hinges on harmonisation, harmonising support systems is a crucial learning from Malawi. 
 
 Harmonised delivery mechanisms and coverage – the Mchinji and VE trials have 
proved that it is possible to use one platform to deliver two forms of support, without 
incurring extra delays or costs, helping streamline programmatic response and 
therefore enabling systemic efficiency gains. The VE trial was seen as a test of 
whether long-term SRSP was viable, and it worked – top-ups were delivered on time, 
the FSP had sufficient liquidity and managed the additional transfers and 
disaggregated reporting requirements, and communications and perceptions were 
managed. Information from the humanitarian response was effectively integrated into 
the VE/SCTP process, and the evidence provision was clear and coherent.22 However, 
coverage is critical, with the need to significantly expand the e-payment strategy and 
architecture in Malawi under the SCTP (which is currently only operating in two of 28 
districts), potentially as part of a wider GoM/donor agreement with key FSPs. It is 
noteworthy that when Irish Aid originally tendered for e-payment FSPs in Balaka in 
2013 it had one interested party, but when they re-tendered for Ntcheu and Balaka in 
2017, 13 banks applied, showing a clear increase in interest from FSPs to engage in 
social protection programmes. Further, in negotiating the FSP contract, Irish Aid 
integrated a clause that stated the FSP would execute VE at no extra cost, which is 
important to include from the outset to avoid negotiation and implementation delays 
later. 
 
 Harmonised and digitised databases and management information systems (MISs). 
Beyond harmonising delivery channels, MISs need to be designed for interoperability 
around common criteria (programming code, common geographic zoning,23 
modules/fields, data collection tools, and common identifiers such as the national ID). 
This will help to avoid significant duplication of effort, potential fraud, and excessive 
inclusion/exclusion errors. Findings from the UBR/MVAC trial showed that using the 
UBR to pre-populate the beneficiary list for the MVAC humanitarian response 
minimised the influence of traditional authorities (which was sometimes perceived 
negatively) and saved time at critical stages such as registration and data entry, while 
also enhancing coordination amongst partners. The study also noted that an important 
step to improve interoperability would be designing a digitised MVAC database that 
‘pushes’ data back to the UBR (WFP/United Purpose 2017). Relying on the UBR for 
                                                 
22  Current plans to test paying PWP and SCTP beneficiaries through the same delivery system (an upcoming GIZ/WB 
pilot) are also welcomed. 
23  For instance, the SCTP MIS uses clusters whilst MVAC uses traditional administrative units of Extension Planning 
Areas (EPAs), Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Group Village Headman administrative (GVH). 
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MVAC misses the fact that individual programmes still need their own databases/MISs 
for routine programme management, coordination and transfers, and the lack of plans 
to create a MVAC database/MIS risks making future SRSP efforts more cumbersome 
and costly at operational level. In the spirit of building on what exists, WFP’s SCOPE or 
World Vision’s LMS systems could be used as the basis for a MVAC MIS, assuming 
they are used by everyone and key programming criteria and fields could be made 
compatible with the UBR, and the national ID unique identifier could be integrated. A 
common MVAC database/MIS would also require robust data protection and privacy 
regulations with firewalls when used alongside the UBR. 
 
As noted in the VE trial, the SCTP MIS in particular needs further adaptation for SRSP, 
meaning its geographic zoning could to be aligned to that of MVAC (as MVAC follows 
regular administrative areas), and it has to be able to track which SCTP households 
are receiving top-ups. Without this, it cannot provide automatically disaggregating lists 
and reports to facilitate case management and payroll. The design of a dedicated 
module or adaptation of the ‘linkages and referrals’ module, as was suggested during 
the mission, could be explored.  
 
 Harmonising grievance referral mechanisms (GRMs). The SRSP trials in Malawi all 
found that, in general, there was a lack of awareness around the available GRMs for 
SCTP and MVAC. GRMs are critical for SRSP for several reasons: (a) inclusion errors 
are compounded if a technically ineligible household receives multiple forms of 
assistance, and the potential for inclusion and exclusion can potentially become 
greater when the targeting criteria are blended across SP and humanitarian 
programmes; (b) well-functioning GRMs help with the reallocation of resources (e.g. if 
contingent funding is not used on a shock, it can be used to address exclusion errors 
(as in Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) (Government of Ethiopia 
2014));  and (c) blending systems for SRSP requires heightened transparency and 
accountability to build recipient confidence. Combining two separate GRMs (such as 
one for the regular SCTP and one for MVAC response, with the former incorporating 
the latter and scaling during the MVAC response with extra capacity) is an 
underexplored area for SRSP. 
 
7.8 Community perceptions strong on ‘double dipping’  
Whilst beneficiaries themselves do not seem to object to the principle that the most needy 
can receive top-ups, strong objections remain around ‘double dipping’ (the rule that no one 
should benefit from two programmes simultaneously). This is due to a few factors such as 
widespread poverty distribution in Malawi, concern over the influence of chiefs and other 
community members in the targeting processes, and a general sense of community justice 
(everyone should get a little, as someone considered ‘better off’ today could be ‘worse off’ 
tomorrow). VE reduces this influence and perception (presumably as it is harder to know who 
is receiving two forms of support through e-payment), but does not eradicate it. The wider 
issues of whether social assistance programmes are sufficient in terms of breadth (number of 
people covered), depth (amount transferred), or longer-term graduation potential remain, 
albeit whilst noting that taken together public works, SCTP, school feeding and WFP’s FFA 
programme cover over 7 million people.24 The ‘no double dipping’ rule impacts on wider 
strategies of graduation that precisely rely on a combination of interventions to the same 
household level to succeed.  
 
When combining SCTP and MVAC, a zero sum game is at play. Using humanitarian 
resources to ‘top-up’ SCTP recipients during the lean season means either that other eligible 
households miss out, or that the total needs and fundraising requirements for humanitarian 
                                                 
24  Noting that in 2019 the World Bank-funded PWP component withdraws almost entirely. 
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partners have to increase. This provides some of the rationale for regular social assistance 
programmes creating contingency budget lines for lean season or shock-based top-ups into 
their multi-year budgetary planning as a complementary measure.  
 
7.9 Review targeting criteria for SRSP 
The VE report (UNICEF/WFP 2018a) underlines that targeting in Malawi is tricky, as poverty 
levels are widespread and relatively homogenous, meaning no one targeting method can 
adequately identify ‘the need within need’, programme coverage is limited, and exclusion 
errors by definition are high. Separating out chronic poverty from climate vulnerability or food 
insecurity is often a fine point. Communities, therefore, also find it hard to apply targeting 
criteria and distinguish between relatively minor differences, with the added pressure of 
social scrutiny and hierarchy.25 Meanwhile, the UBR/MVAC trial noted that the UBR could not 
be used to pre-rank households for a food security-based emergency response, as the PMT 
poverty rankings do not adequately reflect (especially shorter-term) vulnerability to food 
insecurity – a fact being acknowledged in other SRSP contexts such as the Sahel (Schnitzer 
2016). Likewise, some key data in the UBR has a short shelf-life and requires regular 
updating, and community perceptions of fairness through the generation of predefined lists 
from the UBR (ranked or not) were divided – some felt it a top-down imposition, others that it 
provided more objectivity and left less room for external influence (WFP/United Purpose 
2017). 
 
The VE trial recommended looking at categorical indicators (such as who heads the 
household, dependency ratios, the age of recipients), coupled with indicators assessing 
medium-term food insecurity and coping capacity as a potentially more effective combination 
for identifying common eligibility across the SCTP and MVAC programmes for lean season 
support. This is currently in the process of being explored through a study by WFP supported 
by ECHO, and is part of a wider discussion taking place in other contexts such as the Sahel, 
where World Bank research is looking at combining indicators from the PMT and Household 
Economy Analysis (HEA) (see again Schnitzer 2016). 
 
7.10 Enhanced coordination from national to local level is essential  
Malawi is making slow but steady progress in trialling different approaches and building the 
evidence base for SRSP. Alongside the various trials, some big pieces of the systems puzzle 
have been or are being put into place, such as the introduction of the IPC, the review of 
JEFAP, and the roll-out of national ID and its linkage to the UBR. The challenge is in 
systematising and coordinating what has been trialled into coherent approaches. Otherwise, 
SRSP risks introducing further fragmentation, as everyone creates their own shock-
responsive mechanism, making on-the-ground coordination during the lean season 
especially hard.  
 
Continued coordination across SP and humanitarian actors will be needed at central and 
decentralised levels. This has begun with the SRSP Learning Task Force (SRSP LTF), which 
for now coordinates learning, with a question over how joint coordination of operations could 
function in the future. Improved alignment of coordination structures is being investigated in 
Malawi, relating to the district level Civil Protection Committees that support humanitarian 
functions, and the Community Social Support Committees that support SP functions, 
amongst many others. These committees manage different programmes but often include 
many similar members. Likewise, collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government could 
be considered to integrate SP/SRSP concepts and activities into the Socio-Economic Profiles 
                                                 
25  Whilst 86 per cent of SCTP households in the MVAC-affected areas were eligible for MVAC support, during the VE trial 
only 19 per cent were registered for MVAC by the communities using the JEFAP process (UNICEF/WFP 2018a). Forty-
four per cent of those surveyed admitted that SCTP households were being excluded from MVAC despite meeting the 
criteria and being in need. 
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(SEPs), the District Development Plans (DDPs), and the Village Action Plans (VAPs). 
Without this, social protection priorities are not taken into consideration at district level, and 
centralised government resources are not earmarked. The timing of information provision is 
also critical – for instance, MVAC needs to provide information on areas and numbers 
affected with sufficient time to plan for VE (e.g. ideally eight to ten weeks before the MVAC 
response begins), and SP partners need to provide information, aligned to MVAC geographic 
zoning, of VE coverage in shock-affected areas to avoid double targeting.  
 
7.11 Improved communication and advocacy of SRSP   
As SRSP is a new concept, continuous effort will be needed to ensure it is understood right 
down to the local level. It needs to be discussed and accepted by district authorities and 
implementers as well as beneficiaries, with investments in clear and joint communication 
packages for all involved (implementers, recipients and the wider public) required 
(UNICEF/WFP 2018a). Likewise, Malawi is following a thorough learning agenda around 
SRSP with very useful outputs (the ODI 3SP study, the MNSSP II, the AI/VE/UBR+MVAC 
reports and guidance) that other countries could learn from. Meanwhile, there are several 
areas where Malawi could learn from other countries trialling SRSP, such as defining 
triggers, designing risk financing, researching the best targeting methodologies (see O’Brien 
et al. (2018), the World Bank (2018g), and forthcoming work from the European 
Commission).  
 
7.12 Develop SRSP standard operating procedures (SOPs)  
Whilst the VE trial led to the development of VE guidance, there is likely still the need to 
develop wider standard operating procedures (SOPs) for SRSP, starting with VE, but open to 
adaptation should other SRSP mechanisms be taken forward. SOPs would outline which 
actors do what and when, within what time frame, for all aspects of a SRSP mechanism. The 
SOP can be updated for every response, and could be a key output for the SRSP LTF, 
although currently the LTF has only considered slow-onset shocks, with fast-onset shocks 
also requiring a similar process of elaboration and coordination. 
 
7.13 Vulnerable groups need differentiated support and more research for 
SRSP   
The VE report (UNICEF/WFP 2018a) noted that during the trial, most core food insecurity 
indicators for very vulnerable categories of household (especially child-headed) actually got 
worse during the lean season, even with the top-up (their coping strategy index score 
worsened by 100 per cent over the intervention period). The report showed not only that, as 
a category, child-headed households are more consistently food insecure, but that (more) 
cash assistance alone may not be the answer, and has to be potentially accompanied by 
other activities (links to services, livelihood activities, community outreach groups). It is an 
area that potentially deserves further research to ensure VE and other SRSP mechanisms 
adhere to ‘do no harm’ principles. 
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